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Third-party code inclusion is rampant, potentially exposing sensitive 
data to attackers. Protected Web components can keep private data 
safe from opportunistic attacks by hiding static data in the Document 
Object Model (DOM) and isolating sensitive interactive elements within 
a Web component.
T
he Web has evolved from including 
static images and document links to 
comprising Web applications with in-
dividual components provided by 
 numerous service providers. When a Web ap-
plication incorporates third-party components 
using remote scripts, the user’s browser will run 
the third-party code within the security context 
of the Web application. This not only exposes the 
code’s functionality to the Web application but 
also gives the included code full access to the Web 
application’s client-side context, including the 
page’s content, local data, and origin-protected 
functionality. This lack of code isolation can 
have severe consequences if the included code 
doesn’t behave correctly.
Consequently, by including potentially un-
trusted remote scripts, a Web application de-
veloper accepts a certain risk, both for the site’s 
integrity and for the safekeeping of user data. 
Opportunistic attacks on the client-side content 
of a Web application can be mitigated by hiding 
private data and sensitive elements from poten-
tially malicious scripts. For example, iframes sup-
port content isolation in a webpage, albeit with a 
large overhead and a lack in flexibility for integra-
tion in highly dynamic, visually streamlined Web 
applications. Alternatively, JavaScript sandboxing 
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techniques support code isolation,1,2 but don’t 
offer isolation of data in the Document Object 
Model (DOM).3 Finally, the recent Web Com-
ponents specification lets developers instantiate 
custom HTML tags for use within the page.4 A 
major feature of such custom elements is the 
support for a hidden DOM, known as the Shad-
ow DOM.5 Unfortunately, the Web components 
specification focuses on functional separation of 
the DOM and doesn’t offer security features or 
code isolation.
Here, we motivate the need for a flexible mech-
anism that supports the isolation of the user’s 
private data in the DOM, as well as the isolation 
of sensitive elements, such as input elements of 
a login form. Furthermore, we investigate the 
properties of the Web components specification, 
and show that there’s a potential for offering the 
desired level of isolation without compromis-
ing the much needed flexibility of modern Web 
applications.
Use Cases and Existing Technologies
Integrating third-party components using re-
mote scripts is common on the Web. Examples 
include programming APIs and development 
frameworks (such as JQuery and Bootstrap), 
advertising services (such as DoubleClick and 
AdSense), Web analytics tools (such as Google 
Analytics), and social media plug-ins (such as 
Facebook’s “like” button). A 2012 study of re-
mote JavaScript inclusions on the Alexa top 
10,000 sites showed that 88.45 percent include 
at least one remote script, and one site even in-
cluded scripts from 295 remote hosts.6 Further-
more, 68.37 percent of sites included the Google 
Analytics library, and 79.74 percent included at 
least one Google library. Finally, the study ap-
plied a set of metrics to show that 12 percent 
of sites that were deemed security conscious 
included scripts from sites that deployed weak 
security measures.
Including remote scripts not only creates a 
vector for attacks targeting a specific Web ap-
plication, but it also presents an attack vector 
for opportunistic attackers, who aim to execute 
low-profile attacks on a large number of Web 
applications. Such attacks can yield large quan-
tities of sensitive information—for example, by 
scraping the webpage’s user-specific content, re-
cording user-provided input in form fields, and 
 extracting security tokens and session identifi-
ers. Even when developers carefully select only 
trusted third parties for remote script inclusion, 
a certain risk persists, because third-party pro-
viders can be compromised as well. The dangers 
of third-party script inclusions are best illus-
trated by real-world examples, such as on-screen 
keyboard scraping malware,7 malware spread 
through advertisements,8 or actual compromises 
of third-party providers.9,10 
An opportunistic attacker can gain access to 
the Web application’s client-side context through 
several attack vectors—for example, by compro-
mising a remotely included script or advertise-
ment, or through a cross-site scripting attack 
(XSS). Because of the wide variety of sites that 
can be compromised through a malicious script 
or advertisement, opportunistic attackers carry 
out nontargeted attacks, such as looking for input 
elements of the type password, or scraping any us-
er-specific displayed content, such as email mes-
sages, health records, and bank statements.
Use Cases
In light of the opportunistic attacker model, we 
propose three general use cases that benefit from 
effectively isolating data or HTML elements 
within the browser.
Displaying sensitive information. Many Web 
applications process and display user-specific 
information, which is often considered private 
and sensitive. Common examples of such pri-
vate data are email messages, chat conversations, 
bank statements, and security challenges. Op-
portunistic attackers can easily inspect and col-
lect such sensitive information because it isn’t 
isolated from the rest of the page, which includes 
third-party scripts.
An effective isolation mechanism for in-appli-
cation content could prevent inspection or col-
lection by an opportunistic attacker.
Even when developers carefully select 
only trusted third parties for remote 
script inclusion, a certain risk persists.
38 IT Pro  January/February 2015
IT SecurITy
Protecting security tokens. A variant of dis-
played private information are application- 
related, hidden security tokens, often associated 
with a user’s session. For example, the security 
tokens protecting against cross-site request forg-
ery (CSRF) attacks are embedded as hidden form 
elements.11
Hiding such security tokens from opportu-
nistic attackers raises the security level of the 
applied countermeasures, thereby eliminating 
alternative attack vectors.
Protecting sensitive input elements. A third 
use case focuses on protecting client-side input 
elements, in contrast to hiding server-delivered 
content. Most Web applications contain sensitive 
input elements, such as HTML password elements 
and on-screen keyboards. Opportunistic attack-
ers can easily gather sensitive user-provided data 
by using generally applicable selectors for sensi-
tive input elements.
Isolating such sensitive input elements from 
opportunistic attackers ensures that user-provid-
ed input cannot easily be stolen with a nontarget-
ed attack. Note that such an isolation mechanism 
must extend toward event handlers associated 
with isolated input elements.
Motivating Empirical Evidence
The inclusion of potentially untrusted third-
party code into a Web application is a common 
though potentially dangerous practice.6 Two im-
portant industry-driven surveys of the most criti-
cal software errors warn of this risk. The Open 
Web Application Security Project (OWASP) 
Top Ten Project, which lists the 10 most dan-
gerous risks for Web applications, gives “using 
 components with known vulnerabilities” ninth 
place.12 A similar initiative, the CWE/SANS Top 
25 Most Dangerous Software Errors, puts “inclusion 
of functionality from untrusted control sphere” 
at the 16th spot.13
To support the high rankings in these indus-
try surveys, and to establish the relevance of the 
aforementioned use cases, we conducted two rel-
atively small-scale experiments. To support the 
use cases for hiding sensitive data in the DOM, 
we investigate popular online password manag-
ers, where the DOM holds all of the user’s pass-
words to every website. The second experiment 
supports the use case for protecting sensitive in-
put elements by measuring the exposure of login 
forms to third-party script providers.
Password managers. Online password manag-
ers are used to store the multitude of authenti-
cation credentials required on the modern Web. 
This private and highly sensitive data is often 
even stored in an encrypted container, which is 
decrypted at the client side when the client pro-
vides the correct master key. One might expect 
that in such a sophisticated setup, the decrypted 
data is handled with care, preventing any risk of 
stolen or leaked data.
For seven online password managers, gath-
ered from the top 20 results for the Google query 
“free online password manager,” we investigated 
whether they include scripts from a third-par-
ty on the page that hosts the passwords in the 
DOM, giving these scripts full access to the us-
er’s credentials. As Table 1 shows, six of the seven 
(86 percent) include third-party scripts from at 
least one remote host on the page that displays 
the user’s passwords. The Ghostery browser ex-
tension (https://www.ghostery.com/en/) consid-
ers all scripts to be analytics. Additionally, two 
password managers include scripts from addi-
tional remote hosts on their main page, which is 
situated within the same origin as the sensitive 
page.
Login forms. Almost every webpage has a login 
form, which are a trivial target from which an op-
portunistic attacker can extract user credentials. 
We crawled the Alexa top 1,000 sites, looking for 
login forms situated on a page with third-party 
script inclusions, thereby giving the third party 
full access to the login form.
Table 1. Six of the seven highest ranking free online 
password managers include at least one remote 
script on the user password page.
Search 
ranking Name
No. of remote 
scripts
1 PassPack 1
3 LastPass 1
4 Norton Identity Safe 4
5 Keeper 1
8 Dashlane 1
10 clipperz 0
16 Mitto 1
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We found that 52 percent of the 
websites included a login form, and 
all of them included at least one 
third-party script in the login page. 
Of the sites with a login form, 40 
percent included scripts from more 
than five different third-party hosts. 
Figure 1 shows the right-skewed 
distribution of login pages includ-
ing scripts from remote hosts, with 
an average number of 3.4 hosts on 
a login page, and an extreme of one 
login page including code from 36 
different remote hosts. These num-
bers indicate that a scenario with 
an opportunistic attacker targeting 
login forms is, unfortunately, very plausible.
Existing Technologies
Several technologies are relevant when discuss-
ing third-party script inclusion and content 
separation.
Document isolation. Web developers can use 
frames or iframes to isolate content in separate 
documents to varying degrees, depending on 
the associated origins. Placing data in a docu-
ment with a different origin from the main 
document effectively offers both DOM-based 
and script-based isolation, and further restric-
tions are available through the HTML5 sandbox 
attribute.
Document-based isolation offers strong secu-
rity guarantees but has a rigid, block-level struc-
ture, making it less attractive for modern Web 
applications. Additionally, frames with different 
origins require a separate roundtrip to fetch the 
content, causing a delay in page load times.
JavaScript sandboxing. Driven by the rise in 
remote script inclusions, script-based sand-
boxing techniques are being developed and 
deployed.1,2 By isolating a remote script in a 
sandbox, developers gain fine-grained control 
over its capabilities, thereby preventing the 
script from misbehaving.
Although sandboxing techniques can effec-
tively be used to contain remote scripts, they typ-
ically don’t provide a way to isolate parts of the 
DOM, making it difficult to secure the described 
use cases.
DOM separation. The Web Components speci-
fication combines a set of technologies allowing 
the creation of custom HTML elements.4 One 
interesting technology is the shadow DOM, 
which allows custom elements to hide their in-
ternal DOM structure from the outside world.5 
One currently deployed example is the HTML5 
video element, which features a control bar with 
play/pause buttons. The internals of the video el-
ement are implemented using traditional HTML 
elements but are hidden from the webpage and 
the user via the shadow DOM.
The shadow DOM is well suited to hiding con-
tent in the DOM but doesn’t prevent later access, 
nor does it offer script-based isolation properties.
Protected Web Components
Web components are the most viable starting 
point for creating a protection mechanism for 
private data and sensitive elements against op-
portunistic attackers.4 They offer the required 
flexibility to cope with the highly dynamic re-
quirements of modern Web applications, as 
opposed to iframes, and already possess the ca-
pability to host a separate DOM tree using the 
shadow DOM, a property that is hard to achieve 
using JavaScript sandboxing technologies.
To leverage Web components to create pro-
tected Web components, we must be able to hide 
static data in the DOM tree, without it being ac-
cessible to opportunistic attackers. Second, pro-
tected Web components should be able to host 
interactive elements, without being vulnerable to 
script-based compromises—for example, through 
function-overriding or prototype-poisoning 
Figure 1. Empirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF) of the 
percentage of login pages of popular Alexa sites, and the number of 
unique remote hosts from which they request JavaScript code.
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 attacks. In this section, we explain how shadow 
DOM trees can be permanently hidden by taking 
advantage of ECMAScript 5 getters, and elaborate 
on techniques that can be used to isolate script 
code within a hidden tree. Figure 2 illustrates the 
use of protected Web components in a password 
manager.
Hiding Static Data
The goal of the first and second use cases was to 
embed private, user-specific data into the DOM 
tree, without exposing it to an  opportunistic 
 attacker, who uses DOM manipulation tech-
niques to extract potentially sensitive infor-
mation. Such techniques include the use of 
JavaScript DOM APIs, stylesheet operations, and 
custom selectors.
The shadow DOM supports the creation of sepa-
rate DOM trees, which are attached to traditional 
HTML elements using the shadowRoot 
property, and composed into a single 
DOM tree during the rendering pro-
cess. The main document and any 
embedded shadow DOM trees are 
functionally separated, limiting the 
propagation of Cascading Style Sheets 
(CSS) or selectors between the main 
document and the subtrees, in both 
directions. Shadow DOM trees are al-
ready used to implement browser con-
trols, such as the playback bar for the 
video element, and can also be used by 
a developer through a JavaScript API. 
Note that the browser’s internal shadow 
DOM trees are not accessible through 
the shadowRoot property, whereas devel-
oper-created shadow DOM trees re-
main accessible from JavaScript.
Unfortunately, the latter property of script-
defined shadow DOM trees conflicts with the 
goal of hiding static data in the DOM. How-
ever, by redefining the getter of the shadowRoot 
property, developers can make their script-
defined DOM trees inaccessible to JavaScript. 
Figure 3 shows the creation and population of 
a shadow DOM, and the overriding of the get-
ter to return null instead of a reference to the 
shadow DOM.
After redefining the getter and wiping all exist-
ing references to the shadow DOM, it’s no longer 
possible to directly access the data stored in the 
shadow DOM. Therefore, instantiating an inac-
cessible shadow DOM tree with sensitive data 
before loading untrusted code ensures that the 
private data will never be exposed to opportunis-
tic attackers.
Isolating Interactive Scripts
The third use case aims to protect sensitive input 
elements from untrusted scripts. Sensitive input 
elements are usually part of a form, and they typ-
ically depend on JavaScript handlers for interac-
tive input processing and validation.
Although the shadow DOM is ideally suited 
to isolating elements from the rest of the page, 
a problem arises when these elements use Ja-
vaScript handlers for processing input events. 
The shadow DOM offers functional separation 
but doesn’t instantiate a separate JavaScript 
context, leaving the JavaScript code defined 
Figure 3. Data can be hidden in the shadow 
DOM by clearing existing references and 
redefining the only access point.
Figure 2. Protected Web components for data security: (a) a password 
manager page containing private data and sensitive elements, 
together with a third-party advertisement, without any isolation or 
protection; (b) the effect of using protected Web components.
(a) (b)
var protected = document.createElement(‘div’);
var root = protected.createShadowRoot();
//Append data to the root
root = null;
Object.defineProperty(protected, “shadowRoot”,
{ get: function() { return null; }});
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in the shadow DOM vulnerable to several at-
tacks, such as function overriding and proto-
type poisoning.
To obtain protected Web components, the 
shadow DOM’s script code needs to be effective-
ly isolated, not only to prevent JavaScript func-
tions and variables from leaking into the global 
namespace, but also to prevent the use of po-
tentially contaminated functions defined in the 
global namespace or Object prototypes. Obtain-
ing this isolation in the current shadow DOM re-
quires two separate steps. First, any code within 
the shadow DOM should be encapsulated in a 
separate namespace, which is possible in JavaS-
cript through the correct use of closures. Second, 
the use of potentially contaminated functions 
can be prevented by storing and using known 
good versions of the required functions, a tech-
nique often used in JavaScript sandboxing and 
policy enforcement mechanisms.14,15 Figure 4 is 
a brief code snippet using closures and known 
good functions.
Isolating the shadow DOM’s JavaScript code, 
in combination with overriding the shadowRoot 
getter, effectively supports HTML elements con-
taining sensitive data, while maintaining script-
based interaction.
Motivating Examples Revisited
Protected Web components offer a strong mecha-
nism to isolate data and sensitive elements within 
the DOM tree, without sacrificing the flexibility 
to place this data anywhere within the page, like 
iframes do. These properties ensure that protect-
ed Web components are well suited to meet the 
three use cases described earlier. 
Displaying sensitive information. By embed-
ding sensitive data in a secure Web component, 
using the shadow DOM to hide static data, we ef-
fectively prevent an opportunistic attacker from 
extracting the data in an automated way.
Protecting security tokens. Because security 
tokens are often embedded in interactive ele-
ments such as forms, they can be protected by 
placing the element inside a secure Web compo-
nent. Security tokens, such as CSRF tokens, are 
part of the DOM, and the secure component will 
prevent an opportunistic attacker from extract-
ing them.
Protecting sensitive input elements. Sensi-
tive input elements capture user input and can 
be a target for opportunistic attackers. These ele-
ments can be placed in a secure Web component 
as well, preventing direct querying by an attacker. 
If these input elements depend on script-based 
handlers for validation, autocompletion, and so 
on, the handler code must be part of the secure 
Web component as well.
The protected Web components not only fit the 
three proposed use cases but also protect against op-
portunistic attackers in the two  examples  presented 
earlier. First, the online password managers can use 
protected Web components to prevent deliberate 
or inadvertent extraction of the user’s credentials 
from the DOM, while preserving the possibility of 
including third-party scripts. In the second sce-
nario, the login forms and associated handlers can 
be embedded in a protected Web component, pre-
venting a curious or malicious script from stealing 
the user’s credentials through input events.
A lthough protected Web components offer significant security benefits against a re-alistic, ubiquitous opportunistic attacker, 
they also have a limited impact. First, by embed-
ding sensitive elements in a secure Web compo-
nent, they are effectively separated from the rest 
of the page, preventing any interactions, even 
from legitimate code within the page. Therefore, 
all code interacting with a sensitive element must 
be loaded in the secure component. Typically, this 
code is closely tied to the element anyway, with 
validation handlers and autocompletion code as 
an example. Continuing on these handlers, we 
regret that the full implementation burden rests 
once again with the developer. Therefore, we envi-
sion the Web components specification endorsing 
two configurable extensions to the current model: 
•	 hiding a shadow DOM, where the shadowRoot at-
tribute doesn’t return a reference to the shad-
ow DOM, similar to the current behavior of 
user-agent-created shadow DOMs, and
Figure 4. By using closures and known good copies of 
functions, scripts can be isolated within the shadow 
DOM.
(function() {
var getElement = document.getElementById;
var data = getElement(“shadowInput”).textContent;
//...
})()
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•	 instantiating a new script context within the shad-
ow DOM, ensuring that all scripts imported by 
the shadow DOM are separate from the host-
ing page. 
The latter extension is comparable to how Web 
workers also run in a separate context, enabling 
messaging through a predefined interface. The 
possibility of instantiating new script contexts 
in a shadow DOM also benefits the deployment 
of Web components, because it prevents  naming 
and scoping conflicts between the different im-
ported components and the host page. The 
downside of instantiating a new script context is 
the lack of shared global variables, requiring any 
libraries to be loaded in each context.
Hiding private content and sensitive elements 
through Web components can help mitigate op-
portunistic, nontargeted attacks, but it doesn’t 
offer an airtight security solution. We consider 
this approach to be part of the recent trend in 
client-side security mechanisms, which signifi-
cantly improve the security of client-side aspects 
of Web applications, often by applying the de-
fense-in-depth principle. Previously adopted ex-
amples are the HttpOnly flag for cookies, which 
prevents several common session attacks; and 
the Content Security Policy,16 which significant-
ly raises the bar for typical cross-site scripting 
attacks. 
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